Since the founding of behaviorism, most behaviorists have stressed the importance of objectivity for a natural science of behavior. This does not imply, however, that they ignored or denied subjectivity. Skinner's radical behaviorism, for example, equated subjectivity with mainly events inside the skin; Kantor's interbehavioral psychology equated it with uniqueness; and Stephenson's Q methodology equated subjectivity with perspective or point of view. This paper clarifies these approaches to subjectivity and emphasizes their importance in a natural science of behavior, and places Stephenson's behaviorism within the context of the others, examining some of the similarities and differences among them.

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Journal Operant Subjectivity
Bryan D. Midgley, & Edward K. Morris. (2002). Subjectivity and Behaviorism: Skinner, Kantor, and Stephenson. Operant Subjectivity, 25(3/4), 127–138. doi:10.15133/j.os.2002.009