"A world community can exist," said Hutchins (1945), "only with world communication, which means something more than extensive shortwave facilities scattered about the globe. It means common understanding."

We take the latter word extremely seriously, and wish to give it highest place in science. There is no ethic, no metaphysic, no sentiment in the wish, but merely an abductive approach to what is so obvious that few can see the wood for the trees. Someone has said that we shall never understand one another until we reduce the language of the world to seven words. This we cannot hope to do. But it can be reduced to a relatively small number of schemata—infinitely fewer in number than most people would suppose, and, if these could be recognized, then in course of time the chances of common understanding for us all is by this degree enhanced.

In a series of papers, concourse theory has been applied to understanding in the physical sciences

**Continued from the previous issue.**

*Operant Subjectivity*, 1986(Apr), 9(3), 73-96.
(Stephenson, 1972a), to the humanities (Stephenson, 1972b), to intelligence (Stephenson, 1973a), and to other major areas of scholarly concern, especially politics, international communication, advertising, and of course self psychology itself.

With respect to the physical sciences, the application suggests that scientific thinking is largely communication pleasure, rooted in the common conversations of scientists, most of which is opinion and not the vaunted objectivity of that discipline. Conversational communication, one concludes, and not information alone or even saliently, is at the heart of the physical sciences, and it would have been pleasant to know how the schemata of a Teller and an Oppenheimer contrasted in the opening days of this thermonuclear age (Stephenson, 1972a).

In the case of the humanities, we all remember C.P. Snow's (1963) concern about the lack of "common communicability" in the West. Science and the humanities were not on speaking terms. Leavis (1962) argued that the West needs more humanism, and doubted whether we are more human today than primitive peoples (p. 303). Science cannot be made of a poem, Leavis maintained, since it is experienced "only in the recreative response of individual minds"; literature is "for the sake of humanity," for the "deepest verities" of the human future. Maxwell (1968), with a friendly humanistic eye, argues that the humanities are methodologically in a weak position: "There is no one or no single group of even nominally neutral research techniques by which a researcher arrives at an interpre-

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6. The terms communication pleasure and communication pain have not been introduced in the current paper so far, but refer to basic principles of "play" and "work," respectively, with respect to self-theoretical considerations. Communication pleasure, like understandings, brings about no change in the world. Communication pain, like objective explanations, is in relation to information and change. In each case the abduction concerns what happens to the self, subjectively regarded, and is quite operant, as will be seen in the sequel.
tation of 'Ode on a Grecian Urn'' (p. 82). Along the lines of "it is raining," however, it is a simple matter to find a concourse for the "Ode" and to determine schemata for it, as in our study for graduates in English literature (Stephenson, 1972b). It is no less straightforward to put the claims of virtue in the humanities to empirical proof by determining, for example, what four years of English literature does for a student's understanding as distinct from his knowledgeability in the discipline. What does four years do to his schemata?

As for intelligence, the conclusions are devastating: Intelligence has been conceived by mental test psychologists objectively in terms of problems to which there are right (logical) answers, when in fact most problems in human affairs are not in this framework at all. They are multivalued, as Vickers (1967) has observed. Precisely as for "it is raining," problems in life are likely to be set in a concourse of communication and are solved in relation to schemata in which interests, belief systems and values enter into the answers beside reasoning. Thus, if one proposes to give $2000 to a city to help it, how might the money best be spent? There are a thousand and one possible answers, a whole concourse of possibilities. Yet studies show that there are not a thousand and one schemata but only three or four, and that from these there is the possibility of a publicly agreed-upon solution to the problem if it happens that there is common saliency for one particular "statement" across the different schemata. Like the problem vis-a-vis "it is raining," we found, for example, that random individuals in a city to which this $2000 problem could apply provided three Q factors, indicating three schemata: One was in relation to "family" interests, for playgrounds and the like; another ranged into ecological and cultural pursuits; the third was strictly "economic." All three agreed, however, that giving the money for parks would be a good solution (Stephenson, 1973a). Each schemata involved its own values and interests: As psychologists from Leibnitz to Ward (1920) assumed, but today's psychologists have forgotten, all cognition is dispositional by nature.
Intelligence test theory faces formidable inroads as well from artificial intelligence machines (Turing, 1950) which reduce much of it to simple algorithms and pattern-recognition devices for computers. Newell and Simon (1963) remark that "creative" intelligence is no longer quite what it seemed to be to psychologists, and Minsky (1963) adds that intelligence is probably largely an aesthetic matter—a concern for one's dignity, for the dignity of Caucasians, for example, over Blacks, denoting "little more than the complex of performances which we happen to respect, but do not understand" (Minsky, 1963: 447). From our theoretical standpoint, however, all intelligence problems are communication problems, involving concourses upon which the individual imposes his value systems, and until this is introduced into psychological theory of cognition, the nature of intelligence, a problem for Spearman (1923) as for Guilford (1967), will never find a satisfactory answer.

There is wide belief that philosophers, scientists, and statesmen (for example) think differently. Plato described his thinking as a silent dialogue in the confines of his own mind. Zachary Young (1951) characterized the thinking of scientists as a "muddling through" process, not at all orderly or logical. The statesman is supposed to form dispassionate opinions by pondering over all aspects of complex situations (Arendt, 1967: 54). All such are set in their appropriate concourses, and schemata can readily be found for each, for anyone of the kind, philosopher, scientist, or statesman. The exemplar is that for student No. 4 [Table 2, supra], in which various aspects of self, of communicative pleasure, for example, and communication pain become of direct theoretical interest as understandings (Stephenson, 1973a).

Perhaps the most interesting application of concourse theory is to the foundations of political science. A.F. Bentley's (1908) The Process of Government, in particular, has a modern look, and has engaged the attention of Truman (1951), Moneypenny (1954), Hagan (1958), and others in political science in language paralleling our own, except that Bentley and his successors see everything in the objective
framework. Bentley was searching for a "tool" to bring order into political science. He introduced the concept of "groups," conceived as "so many men striking out" for this-or-that political or economic objective—trades unions, business associations, territories, political parties, and the like. Such "groups," he observed, are subserved by interests, indeed by vested interests. The problem was to define them, as we would now say, operantly, and Bentley went to newspapers, speeches, reports, books and the like to find there what journalists, reporters, and politicians were saying, passing themselves off as spokes­men for public opinion. His raw data on public opinion, therefore, was second-hand; and his "tool" was merely his own analysis of the data, his own thought about it, "thought informed by public opinion," as Weinstein (1962: 188) has convincingly argued, in full agreement with the position taken here. The "tool" Bentley searched for is Q sorting; his "groups" are our schemata; his conclusions are understandings in our sense of the term.

Nowadays pollsters gather opinions directly from the public, and although the polls are thought of mainly as a means for predicting election results, in the hands of public opinion analysts they are in fact attempts to understand the pulse of public opinion. Masses of data gathered by polls during the 1971-72 Presidential election, for example, were used by Harris (1972) of the Harris polling organization to give a truly masterly account of what happened in the Nixon-McGovern contest. According to Harris, Nixon realized in 1971, when his public acceptance was at a low ebb as shown by the polls, that the better-educated in America wanted a change in foreign affairs and domestic fiscal authority. He went to China and Russia, turning 180° from the communist world-domination position he had previously sponsored, and as many degrees also with regard to "controls" on the economy. He realized, too, apparently, that the less-well-educated (Wallace voters) were in no mood for revolutionary domestic changes vis-a-vis welfare, racial equality, and the like. Nixon put the two together to form his massive electoral victory. This is Dr. Harris'
understanding, grasped by reasoning and cogitation over the whole concourse of opinions represented by the polls, to reach an "explanation" of what happened. It is a mistake to suppose, however, that the analysis is purely a rational process on Dr. Harris' part: What is at issue is his own schemata, which, like all others in the domain of opinion, is inevitably value laden.

The problem is, how can we make the analysis of a Harris or a Gallup more viable?

The logic is abductive. One sees fossils on the ground and can argue back to the fact that the sea in primordial times must have covered the rocks on which one stands. The concern is with causes, as to why things happened the way they did. So Dr. Harris, too, cogitates on the masses of data on public opinion and comes up with an interpretation, even with simple slogans--"Don't rock the boat for the poor," "Give the better-educated indications of change," and "Keep quiet meanwhile."

We have shown elsewhere how all of this can be approached by way of Q methodology and concourse theory of communication. The evaluation of public opinion, which is far more than counting opinions for predicting election results, is a complicated matter, as George Carslake Thompson (1966) indicated as long ago as 1886. Thompson's schema for its evaluation was never made operational; however, until recently (Stepphenson, 1964b). It was applied to a study of Canon 35 by Berk (1963), and to the Cuban crisis by Stephenson (1964c). Recently the present author has followed the course of public opinion in America about the Vietnam War during 1971-72, on the same evaluative, concourse theory basis. Early in 1971 there were three main schemata, "hawk," "dove," and "confused"; by 1972 there were four, "hawk" and "dove" as before, but now the "confused" had differentiated into one schemata favorable to North Vietnam and the other to a belief that what is at issue is a civil war in which America has no business to be embroiled.

All of this is merely a beginning, for political science and other disciplines. The communication nexus is clear, for example, in the author's application
of Q methodology to public relations programs (Stephenson, 1969b), and to mass communication most generally in his *The Play Theory of Mass Communication* (Stephenson, 1967). There are studies available on "imagery" for public libraries (Stephenson, 1962), for public health (Stephenson, 1964a), and on medical communication (Stephenson, 1972c). In due course, applications are to be reported on concourse studies for movies (Bonnie and Clyde), and doctoral and master's contributions are already available in this fascinating area (Hunt, 1971; Rawlins, 1964). Papers will appear on Reich's *The Greening of America* (for which our schemata provide sometimes complementary, but also very different understandings); on Kennan's *Democracy and the Student Left* (1968); on Lipset's (1963) study of four democracies; on Almond and Verba's (1963) *The Civic Culture*; and, most thoroughly researched of all, *Rationale for a Subjective Approach to Advertising* (Stephenson, 1973c) in which doctoral and master's candidates contributed (Branham, 1972; Goodall, 1971; Levy, 1971; Schreiber, 1973).

By now others are bringing understandings and abductive explanations to bear on political problems, including Brown and Ellithorp (1970), Khare (1972), and Brenner (1972) amongst others. As recently as a few years ago the author couldn't find a publisher for either his original paper on Thompson's evaluation of public opinion or for a book manuscript entitled *Amelioration of Political Conflict* which, reviewed by political scientists, were rejected by them as either above the heads of their peers, or because of the subjective (i.e., non-normative) character of the studies.

Finally, a study of the play *Orghast* (Croyden, 1971), meant to be an expression of "pure communication," has afforded an opportunity to measure people's schemata before they view a play or go to a theatre, to show first that there can be no "pure" communication (all is value laden whatever the creative artist tries to do), and second, that one can show quite easily how far the theatrical experience influenced one's (pre-existing) schemata. There is nothing static about schemata, which, on the contrary, have dif-
ferentiated ebbs and flows of their own.

THE PROBLEM WITH PROBLEMS

These applications are but a beginning, and one concludes with a broad surveyance of the concourse theory's range and methodological implications.

First as to methodology: Enough has been said to advance the new look position, that abductive methodology is respectable. It is true that in the final analysis it is the inquirer's understandings which are fundamentally at issue, but it need no longer be a case of authorities speaking their arguments, however brilliantly reasoned, unsupported by constraints and checks that can be introduced in terms of concourse theory. The pages of The Center Magazine (the publication of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions), for example, proud effort of Robert M. Hutchins, are massive exercises in opinion in our sense of the word with not a single check on the rampant subjectivity everywhere involved. All are set in concourses of communication, and all can be as subject to our theory as was Keats' "Ode on a Grecian Urn." The compendious source book on Theories of Cognitive Consistency (Abelson et al., 1968) includes papers by 63 authors, making reference to 1,000 papers, in which there are many references to self as a basic concept in Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance (Bramel, in Abelson, p. 365), in role theory (Lecky, p. 206), but with the conclusion by Brewster Smith (p. 372) that "to be useful in the development of consistency theory, more precise and better specified conceptions in the sphere of self are obviously called for." Our theory provides an empirical basis for self, as schemata in relation to concourses of communication, and there can be no other way to reach the self, since subjectivity is all that is at issue, and this is a matter of utterances only. Moreover, it is inconceivable that, with a Wheatstone Bridge available, anyone in physics would merely theorize about a measurement of resistance; so in our domain, one finds it hard to believe that so simple and cogent a matter as the representation of self along Q factor lines is
being widely ignored.

More than 20 years ago the author read a paper at the Psychological Center (National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland) in which he took the then current issue of a well respected social psychological journal in which 20 or so studies were reported, and showed that all but one were premature. They had approached their problems in an objective hypothetico-deductive framework, asserting hypotheses and usually confirming them. The hypotheses, however, were not necessarily those that should have been discovered in the given situations, for the given problems, by way of concourse operations.

Only concrete examples can indicate something of the depth of misdirection in this respect. Consider, for example, Lipset's (1963) study of four democracies, Great Britain, U.S.A., Canada, and Australia in terms of the system of values adumbrated by Parsons (1949) by way of sociological value analysis. He pulled together many sociological facts concerning the school systems, status patterns, respect for law, and so on in the realm of "institutionalized activities," to support a conclusion that the U.S.A. is characterized by the Parsons values of achievement, universalism, equalitarianism, and specificity, whereas, conversely, elitism, ascription, particularism, and diffuseness are at the base of Britain's democracy. Canada and Australia fell in between these extremes, Australia more like America and Canada more like its Mother Country.

It is not necessary for the present author to be critical of the Parsons categorical framework: Others (e.g., Gouldner, 1970) have made this unnecessary. But Lipset's article includes a rich concourse of opinion statements, which flow like shadows over his account of the objective data on institutions. Typical are the following:

... All men are expected to try to improve their position vis-a-vis others.

... You can tell the social status of a person the moment he opens his mouth--his manner of speech gives him away.
... We are tolerant of popular opinion: We are essentially middle-of-the-roaders in politics. ... And so on, for a hundred more.

These are "statements" of a concourse suffusing Lipset's paper, and are clearly part of a mass "popular sociological culture" to which Gouldner (1970, chap. 1) calls attention. When subjected to a search for the schemata at issue, our Q studies show that achievement certainly characterizes the American culture but that a yearning for sovereignty is just as operative: All white Americans, it seems, are born equal, but also sovereign. (The U.S.A., we may remember, is the only nation in the world which won't dip its flag before any other, at the Olympics or anywhere else.) Lipset could never have found this since his postulatory system precluded discoveries.

Another example is the work of Almond and Verba (1963) on The Civic Culture. Based on more than 5,000 interviews conducted in five nations with questionnaires listing several hundred questions (whole and sectionally), the authors' aim was to come to an understanding of the relationship between the attitudes of citizens and the functioning of democratic systems. Their conclusion was that a sense of "national identity," "participant competence," "social trust," "civic cooperativeness," and an "imaginative approach to education" are basic to democratic culture. However, after 13 chapters of categorical analysis of statistical data the two authors felt (as is notoriously the case) that the analysis had tended to obscure the "wholeness of individual countries and the reality of the human beings who constitute them" (Almond & Verba, 1963: 402); they therefore turned in chapter 14 to a "clinical method of analysis," to present a few "illustrative case histories," with the admonition that "the cases of individual respondents are, like all individual cases, unique; and they do not lend themselves easily to generalizations (p. 402). The reasoning, of course, is normative, within the objective framework. There is no "working theory," just a set of unrelated conclusions: How, for example, do the five parameters (national identity,
social trust, etc.) enter into their illustrative cases? Only, of course, as remote explanations on the part of the two authors. But the actual interviews with their "illustrative cases" are the very stuff of communication concourses. Using the data for the American cases (Almond & Verba, 1963: 440-454) one can readily compose a Q concourse, draw a Q sample, and on as few as any 50 Americans begin with a "working theory" that schemata are at issue, which were what the two authors were looking for all the time but couldn't find because of their normative preoccupations. Moreover, having found them, they retain the reality of the human beings; each individual no doubt is indeed unique; and the understandings make such good sense that they are readily accepted as generalizations. There is no question that one has to penetrate, for matters of civic culture, into self identifications much as for "it is raining" and the case of No. 4.

The same applies very widely, wherever, indeed, a normative approach has seemed de rigeur.

MESSAGE SYSTEMS

Finally, about message systems as such there is a great deal to say. The problem, however, is not their values, valencies, grammar, stylisms, or the like, but how they enter subjectively into communication.

We should ask why a novel or a play communicates whereas a lecture or a training manual only informs. The differences turn fundamentally on communication pleasure and communication pain, respectively. What has to be understood is the enjoyment of movies, novels, newspapers, television, gossip, dancing, religion, bull-sessions, politics, and every sort of playing for fun (but not playing to win at all costs). The basis, at least as to part of the pleasure, is described in Freud's (1908) famous essay, "Relation of the Poet to Daydreaming." The poet arouses in us emotions, Freud taught, of which we scarcely thought we were capable—no song is sweeter than the song unsung. As is well known, Freud attributed the enjoyment to displacement of painful emotions (reality related) by pleasurable ones (play related). So the child plays.
Adults, instead, resort to fantasy. One would think that playing may also be enjoyable anyhow, if one is pleasing oneself, and not bent on serious purposes at someone else's behest (Stephenson, 1967). Whatever its origins, whether of the child openly or of the adult vicariously at the movies, in bed, behind a novel, within the pages of a newspaper or whatever, the playing is the same as a play on a stage: It is a tale told, with a hero, villain, action, a beginning and an end. Communication occurs when the individual enters into the play by identifying with the hero (or the like—he may indeed identify with the villain, as children do about film cartoons and comics), having communication pleasure in the process.

This applies to all subjectivity, to every course, explicit or implicit in our theory. Communication pleasure enters the scene from the following considerations. Factor $f_1$ for No. 4 in the example for "it is raining" was interpreted as a "poetical" regard, and his self was in relation to it: Communication pleasure occurs when the self is so entailed, indicating an enhancement or commitment of the self—as though one had grown an inch taller. Factors $f_2$ and $f_3$, interpreted as "nostalgia" and "fun-loving," were his, but not him. They were what he knew. He has no commitment in either of these directions as far as "it is raining" is concerned. The self is absent. Such is communication pain, indicating an absence, loss, or denegation of self in some degree. So we hide our head in shame, a loss of self that we can now demonstrate in $Q$ factor terms.

Schreiber (1973), in a study of advertising message systems from our subjective standpoint, had as subject a man who made his own "chopper" motorcycles, who was an expert motorcycle mechanic, and who performed 17 $Q$ sorts under different conditions of instruction, on a $Q$ sample consisting of magazine advertisements for motorcycles. The "chopper" is the most powerful of symbols in the motorcycling world. Four schemata were found for the individual, E, F, G, and H. His self was on E and F, not on G or H. The interpretation for E was that the young man on his chopper was essentially "showing off"; F indicat-
ed, instead, a preoccupation with safety. Factor G reflected the young man's expert knowledge of the mechanics of motorcycles—he actually constructed his own "choppers." Factor H had reference to the fun aspects of motorcycling, the girls, romances, countryside bowers and the like of the advertiser's "dream factory." The fact was that the young man no longer used his "choppers" as power symbols for roaring and ripping the guts out of the countryside—he was too afraid for that—but he could still show off by strolling along the promenade, a veritable cockbird for everyone to admire. Factor E took F under its wing, and the result is communication pleasure. Expert mechanic as he was, this was work for him, with which he couldn't identify in motorcycling as such—whence G. He was fully aware of the "fun with girls" and the "advertiser's dream world" but he took no part in this, whence H.

What appeals to the young man, his Q factors and testimony alike aver, and observation of his conduct supports, is the substance of factors E and F, not G and H. He would never buy or make a motorcycle except in relation to E and F.

This, then, is the core of message systems in the domain of entertainment and play: They have to be such that the participant can identify with, for expression of himself, so that he gains self stature in the process. Such is communication and communication pleasure with it.

The situation is different for instruction, data processing, learning from manuals and the like: One could teach the above motorcyclist more and more about motor mechanics, and he could acquire more and more knowledge about the "fun" aspects of motorcycling, yet he still wouldn't switch "choppers" for display, for any Harley-Davidson motorcycle in the world.

The principles under discussion are well enough known, and what is new here are the operations defining schemata and self, though one holds, contrary to the Freudian position, that at some points fantasy, and subjectivity generally, is in no need of unconscious alchemy to transmute painful emotions into communication pleasure, a process that does no good to
anyone, and no harm either, except to self enhancement (Stephenson, 1967). In newspaper reading, for example, which is a great skill when properly developed (the newspapers are doing their best, it seems, to blunt it), the reader

...creates his own order, commanding his own grasp of things in the world. There is an air of mystery and ritual about it.... there are few opportunities left to us in which we can go into retreat, as we do within a newspaper, there to talk to ourselves and to practice the arts of self designing. Behind the pages there are moments when we seize upon things in an authentic making of self--we become committed to this or that.... (Stephenson, 1967: 158)

It is such that we can now provide evidence for as applications of concourse theory and the centrality of self in relating to subjectivity.

But consider, as a final example, the most popular television program of 1972, *All in the Family*. It is seen by 60% of the viewers on any occasion. Archie hates Jews, Blacks, Poles, Puerto Ricans, and hippies, atheists, liberals. He has a lingo of his own--dago, meat-head, gooks, and all. The volume of audience laughter is boisterous and enormous. Yet the themes deal with such unlikely matters as homosexuality, racial prejudice, "swinging partners," impotency, the menopause, FBI surveillance, and the like.

Some critics call it tasteless. It is certainly not enjoyed by Blacks or minorities, buy by whites. Nor is it satirical: The BBC progenitor of *All in the Family*, entitled *Till Death Do Us Part*, was bitterly satirical, really showing things as they are; but it raised Cain, and communication pain rather than communication pleasure. *Till Death Do Us Part* put reality on the spot, as a documentary rather than as fiction.

*All in the Family* fits the Freudian displacement standpoint perfectly: In each episode Archie's prejudices are played, but never faced up to. Each story brings homosexuality, race discrimination or whatever
on the stage, but then switches the real problem to Archie and his problem. Archie is the butt of every joke; but in the end we identify with him, and the real problems are apparently ignored, transmuted into laughter.

The pleasure, therefore, would seem to come by taking real problems and displacing them on a prejudiced hero. But is he really an apologist for bigotry and reaction? Is the public really not being allowed, this way, to see itself as it is? Is the laughing encouraging people to suppose these problems don't exist? Or that the major problems of society are due to meatheads, hippies or the like?

Is it not possible that the public couldn't face up to these prejudices before, but now can play with them, at least on the stage? And isn't this the way a child matures, playing off its fears? Is it not also possible that the viewer who laughs gains in self, and that this actually has in it the seeds of self designing? That is, to be able to talk freely of homosexuality afterwards? Of swinging partners? Of racial discrimination? Of impotency? Note especially that the talk is now out in the open, as public conversation, whereas before these same individuals could never have broken the taboos, could never have been so blasé. The prejudices of the Archie Bunkers were there schematically long before Archie came on the stage. The storytelling is reaching these, and there has been nothing of the kind before on American television. How, in the final analysis, does it fare in comparison, say, with the simple communication pleasures of Bonanza?

We need no longer wonder, question, and argue, or marshall facts and figures supportive of one position or another: We consider All in the Family as we do "it is raining," and discover what is at issue with the simple working theory of concourses, schemata, and the centrality of the self. A Q factor study of All in the Family is one of the papers in our series of applications of concourse theory. It is especially interesting, perhaps, that the earliest study in this area of concern was a comparison of fictional and a documentary film treatment of race prejudice: Rawlins
(1964) compared Edward Murrow's documentary *Who Speaks for the South* and the well known movie *Raisin in the Sun* showing that if any converts were made they came from the emotions at issue in fiction, not from the colder rationality of the documentary. The emotions of a song unsung may indeed shake up a little self-designing.

**CONCLUSION**

It is said that women are wiser than men because they know less but understand more. The above pages, it is hoped, are on the side of wisdom.

By a "working theory" is meant asking questions in concrete situations— one town for a study of traffic in towns (Ministry of Transportation, 1963), one Ellen West for existentialism, one medical group for a study of diffusion (Coleman, Katz & Menzel, 1966), one small group on a George Carslake Thompson design for any inquiry into public opinion (Stephenson, 1964b), one television program (*All in the Family*), one book of chapters on a burning issue (Kennan's [1968] *Democracy and the Student Left*), and so on— asking the questions in such a way that understandings are grasped before explanations are sought, if necessary, to confirm them.

Such is the abductive logic upon which the approach to communication has been based in the above pages, and we believe it to be very much in line with the new-look logic of science.

The "working theory" itself asks for full recognition of subjectivity as concourses of communication; of a schematical concept as to how individuals relate to concourses, based on their past experience; and of the self as central to identifications (and much else) in all communication. It calls for separation of communication from information, of opinion from fact; and it is of special importance that concourse theory provides an empirical basis for the measurement of self, and that there can be no way to reach self other than through its own concourses.

Schemata, and not message systems, are the key matters in communication. Their operational defini-
tion by Q methodology is rough and ready, but sufficient for most purposes. One offers two warnings in this regard. First, schemata, though broadly consistent and coherent, are by no means to be conceived as hard nuggets of fact, unbending and fixed by one's past experience. They are, instead, vital, the source of apperception and the nexus of our values and beliefs. Second, a little *simple* factor analysis is all that the operations demand: It will be the end of work in this domain if anyone thinks that its be-all and end-all is factor analysis. The less of it, the better. Three or four factors are all that most well planned studies require; there's something loose in the works if anything like ten or so factors are carved out for interpretation. The key to sound work, i.e., to make discoveries, is what one puts into Q method as abduction, not what factor analysis turns out deductively.

With respect to message systems, which of course mediate communication, the profound matter at issue is *play*. Subjectivity is on a stage, *in esse*. Playing, not to win at any cost but just for the fun of it, characterizes everything that is intrinsically subjective, and therefore all communication as herein considered. For Freud, His Majesty the Ego reigned supreme in all subjectivity, and a healthy individual, Freud argued, should be purged of anything of the kind. For us it is the self, and it requires no purgatives. We can measure this elusive schemata like any other, and this makes the difference between understandings with, and understandings without a measure of control. The way is open, therefore, to orderly understanding of all message systems, as indicated by "it is raining" or our analyses of *All in the Family*. The concern is with communication pleasure. The concern of information is with communication pain --but that is another matter for future elaboration.

One application of concourse theory to which no reference appears above is in the field of college education, and this, no doubt, suggests social engineering. It is a study entitled *Quiddity College* in

7. Quiddity: L. *quidditas*, 1. The real nature or
which the concourse of common communication vis-a-vis college and university education is examined: One discovers that the communication pleasure aspects of college education are widely confused with the communication pain of training schools (for medicine, law, journalism, business, education, and the rest), to everyone's loss. 

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